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ABSTRACT
This paper bridges two related, but up to now, unconnected literatures: economic growth
stability and population-economic growth. The paper is different from previous population-
economic growth analyses by focusing on instability of economic growth in developing
countries. This study contributes to a previous paper on the developing country growth
collapse by adding important demographic variables. The paper provides an explanation for
“new” negative correlations of population and economic growth: because 1960s were a
relatively smooth time for economic growth, youth dependency did not seem important;
however, during turbulent 1970s and 1980s, countries with falling dependency burdens
weathered economic shocks better.
Keywords: economic growth, population growth, demographic transition, developing
countries, instability of economic growth
JEL classification: O1, O4, J103
1. Introduction
An important purpose of this paper is to bridge two highly related, but up to now,
rather unconnected literatures: the economic growth stability literature and the population and
economic growth literature. Essentially, I combine a left-hand-side variable from the former
literature with some of the right-hand-side variables of the latter. By providing a link between
these two literatures, the paper also seeks to shed light on two emerging puzzles from these
literatures: (1) why did some countries’ growth collapse sometime during the 1970’s, and
others’ did not; and (2) why did population growth have a negligible-to-no effect on economic
growth during the 1960s and 1970s, but have a negative impact in the 1980s.
In this paper I follow a research strategy recommended by Pritchett (2000): to analyze
the determinants of changes in growth rates. Specifically, I examine how population may
impact countries’ abilities to withstand external shocks, and thus help explain the volatility of
developing countries’ growth, particularly in the last two decades. This paper is most like
Rodrik (1999), who argued that the presence of domestic social conflict and the institutions in
place to deal with those conflicts impact how countries react to external shocks. He examined
the change in per capita GDP growth over two periods 1960-1975 and 1975-1989, and
various measures of shocks, internal division, and institutions of conflict management. He
found that existence of social consensus and working conflict management institutions lead to
greater persistence of economic growth. The social conflict-management institutions
hypothesis was determined to be robust when considering alternative explanations for the
growth collapse. Indeed, explanations like “more open trade regimes avoided trouble,” “large
public sectors were worse-hit,” or “high indebtedness in the 1970s led to trouble” added little
explanatory power.
The only population variable Rodrik used, however, is a measure of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, which comes from Taylor and Hudson (1972).  This variable is constructed4
from a 1960 USSR study, and measures the probability that two randomly selected persons
from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. The rationale for
including this variable, used by others in growth analyses (e.g., Mauro, 1995, Easterly and
Levine, 1997, and Kenny, 1999), typically is that countries with more divided societies will
either have greater internal conflict or more difficulty implementing policies. But the study
reported here indicates that another population variable—youth dependency—has a
significant bearing on how external shocks impact economic growth.  Yet, the population-
economic growth literature has focused on youth dependency’s impact on the level of
economic growth, not focused as this paper is on the determinants of changes in economic
growth, and the basic finding of that literature can be summarized as: youth dependency had
an insignificant impact on economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, but had a “negative,
statistically significant, and large” impact in the 1980s (Kelley and Schmidt, 2001).
2. Background
Much of the early work on population growth and per capita income growth found
little relationship between the two. Indeed, Kelley and Schmidt (1995) claimed the most
important finding of the literature up to that point, “. . . is the failure, in more than a dozen
studies using cross-country data, to unearth a statistically significant association between
growth rates of population and of per capita output.” This earlier work typically examined
only aggregate population growth rates.
More recent work has either decomposed population growth into fertility and
mortality components or considered the growth rates of important sub-populations (e.g.,
school-aged, working-aged, retired). These studies (Barlow 1994, Bloom and Freeman 1988,
Brander and Dowrick 1994, Kelley and Schmidt 1995, Crenshaw et al. 1997, and Bloom and
Williamson 1998) found a more complex role for population. Specifically, they found
(depending on their exact explanatory variables) either that growth of the working-aged5
population is good for economic growth while growth of young, dependant population is not;
or that increases in fertility or births have an immediate, negative impact, although the
resulting eventual increase in the economically active population will have a delayed, positive
impact. Thus, the demographic transition—the change from high to low rates of mortality and
fertility—produces a “demographic gift” (Bloom and Williamson 1998), “demographic
windfall” (Crenshaw et al. 1997), or “window of opportunity” (Barlow 1994). The studies that
break variables down according to time periods in their analyses (Bloom and Freeman 1988,
Brander and Dowrick 1994, and Kelley and Schmidt 1995) found a stronger negative
correlation between population growth and economic growth in the 1980s. This “new”
negative correlation has not been fully explained (although Kelly and Schmidt 1995, unlike
the others, do offer an explanation).
The developing country growth collapse—i.e., that growth in developing countries
was much lower in the second half of the 1970s and in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1960s
or in the first part of the 1970s—is now well documented. Easterly (2001) calculated that the
median per capita income growth rate in developing countries fell from 2.5 percent over
1960-79 to 0.0 percent over 1980-98.  For the sample of 94 developing countries I consider,
the average per capita GDP growth rate fell from 2.5 percent over 1960-75 to 0.7 percent
during 1975-1992. Pritchett (2000) calculated a single break point (or year) in each country’s
growth from 1960 to 1992 (or to the most recent year with data). For the 87 developing
countries in his sample, only 24 had growth rates of less than 1.5 percent per year prior to
their break year. However, after their break year only 26 countries had growth rates over 1.5
percent, and 32 had negative growth rates post-break. In a similar study, Ben-David and
Papell (1998) calculated specific year break points in growth that are statistically significant
for countries between 1950 and 1990. Twenty-one developing countries in their sample
(which includes a total of 37 developing countries) had negative growth after their break6
point. (For the countries with negative post-break growth, those break years ranged from
1972-1983.)
This collapse of growth is not, however, easy to explain by changes in what are widely
regarded as determinants of growth. According to Easterly (2001), indicators like educational
enrollment, infrastructure, life expectancy, fertility, inequality, and real exchange
overvaluation showed improvement over the 1980s and 1990s, while black market premiums,
inflation, and openness failed to show the kind of deterioration that could explain the growth
decline. Indeed, Easterly argued that, if models of growth using these indicators and policies
were correct, developing country growth rates should have been significantly higher during
the 1980s and 1990s than in the previous decades. Furthermore, external shocks (like wars,
the oil crises, or the economic slowdown in the developed countries) can only explain some of
the variation in growth during the 1970s and 1980s (Easterly et al., 1993 and Rodrik, 1999).
For example, many of the high-growth, East Asian countries experienced external shocks at
least as strong as those encountered in Latin America. Rodrik (1999) argued that variation in
investment can not drive the variation in growth rates over short horizons, since investment
rates are persistent over time—investment in one period is very strongly correlated with
investment in the subsequent period. Thus, it seems GDP growth, particularly in developing
countries, became much harder to achieve in the period beginning sometime during the 1970s.
This study is different from previous population-economic growth analyses in several
important ways. First, rather than try to explain economic growth by assuming it is persistent
(which the previously discussed economic growth literature shows it is not), I focus on
explaining the important finding of the volatility/instability of economic growth in developing
countries. Second, this paper suggests a new theory on how population may matter to
economic growth (the old ways being through the size of the labor force and dependents’
impact on investment and savings). That is, I hypothesize countries with large working7
populations relative to dependent ones may have more resilience to external shocks. This
relationship could exist through the increased policy flexibility that having fewer dependants
(and, thus, fewer “sticky” programs) may afford. Lastly, again by utilizing the recent findings
on the instability of developing country growth, I calculate growth rates based on theoretically
meaningful periods—rather than calculating a single rate spanning the available data set or
using culturally appealing break points (i.e., the decades), as all previously mentioned
population-economic growth studies did. These last two differences allow an explanation of
the “new” population-economic correlation discussed above. In addition, like Bloom and
Williamson (1998) and Crenshaw et al. (1997), I use the more theoretically appealing age-
specific growth rates, rather than birth and death rates. Specifically, I use the rate of change of
the youth dependency ratio, which equals the difference between the growth rates of the
working aged population and the young, dependant population.
3. Methodology and Data
Following Rodrik (1999), I divide the sample into two periods, 1960-1975 and 1975-
1990. (Actually, I use 1992 or the most recent year for which there is GDP data. The specific
countries used and their last year of GDP data is contained in the appendix.)  There are a
number of reasons to support this disaggregation. Pritchett (2000) calculated a mean break
year for developing countries of 1977 and a median of 1978. In addition, Rodrik (1999) ran
his regressions by dividing the sample into two periods using both 1975 and Pritchett’s
individual country break years, and got very similar results.
I begin by running two sets of OLS regressions, each with a different dependent
variable. The first regression uses the difference between growth in the second period and the
sample average growth rate for the second period. In the second regression, the dependant
variable is, as in Rodrik (1999), the growth differential between 1960 to 1975 and 1975 to
1992. I define all rates of change used in this paper as the natural log difference between the8
later data point and earlier one, divided by the number of intervening years. Rates of change
are expressed in percentage terms. For GDP, I use the chain-linked index of real GDP per
capita measured in 1985 purchasing power parity dollars from the Penn World Tables Mark
5.6a.  All population data comes from the World Bank Development Indicators 2000 (with the
one exception of Taiwan, for which the data comes from the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of
the Republic of China). In the first regression, I am interested in explaining why some
countries did much better than others during the second period, given that nearly all countries
did worse than they did in the first period. In the second regression, I am investigating the
degree to which a country’s growth changes over the two periods.  As it turns out, the answers
look much the same for both questions.
For independent variables I use: regional dummies for Latin America and the
Caribbean, Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa (LAC, ASIA, and SSA, respectively); the natural
log of per-capita GDP in 1975 (LNGDP75); lagged GDP growth; the youth dependency ratio
(the population ages 0-14 over the population 15-64) in 1975 (YDEP75), and the rate of
change in the youth dependency ratio from 1975-1990 (YOUTHDEPCHANGE). The
countries included in the regional dummies conform to the standard World Bank definitions.
The lagged GDP growth term is either the difference between average per-year growth during
1960-1975 and the sample average growth for that period, DIFAVG6075 (in the case of the
first regression), or the average per-year GDP growth from 1960-1975, GDPGROWTH6075
(in the case of the second regression). In addition, I, like Rodrik, include ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, ETHNICFRAC, and a measure of government effectiveness/quality,
QUALTGOV9801.
The index for government effectiveness/quality I use comes from a set of aggregate
measures by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). They compile six different
measures of governance, each measure made up of data from various sources, and assign9
countries values ranging from –2.5 to 2.5 for each measure for which a country has some
data. The six aggregate measures are: voice and accountability; political instability and
violence; government effectiveness; regulatory burden; rule of law; and graft.  For each
country I calculate the average over the various measures (not every country has a value for
each of the six different measures), and over the two years for which they report data (1998
and 2001).  I use their measures and take an average over the various measures so I can
include in the regressions each country for which there is relevant population and GDP data.
A popular government quality index (but containing fewer countries)—which was used, for
example, in Easterly and Levine (1997) and Easterly and Kraay (2000), from the Institutional
Investor Risk Ratings, collected over 1960-1998—correlates highly (0.7) with the measure I
use. In addition, Rodrik (1999) argued that measures like Freedom House’s democracy index
are very stable over time (the correlation coefficient across decades is 0.9).
4. Results: a first cut
Before discussing the regression results, I shall show the data. Figure 1 indicates the
first puzzle mentioned at the top of the paper, i.e., many countries had very different growth
experiences in the period 1960-1975 than in 1975-1992. Furthermore, growth in the earlier
period seems to have very little relationship to growth in the later period. Figures 2 and 3
provide some indication of the second puzzle—the changed relationship between population
and economic growth in more recent years. Figure 2 shows no relationship between the
average annual per capita GDP growth during 1960-1975 and the annual rate of change of the
youth dependency ratio over that same period. However, Figure 3 shows a clear, negative
relationship (R
2 of 0.3) during 1975-1990; that is, greater economic growth is correlated with
a larger decline in youth dependency.10
Figures 1-3
The results of the first three regressions (using the two slightly different dependent
variables described above) are shown in Tables 1 and 2.  The independent variables have the
expected signs and are, in general, highly statistically significant.  Most important,
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, quality of government, the change in youth dependency, and
the level of youth dependency in 1975 are all significant and impact as would be expected;
i.e., greater social division leads to greater susceptibility to external economic shocks (or
lower growth in the later period), and a better quality of government and lower dependency
burden (both change and level) lead to higher growth. Both the independent variable
coefficients and their associated standard errors are essentially the same in the two
regressions. The only exception is the variable for lagged economic growth. It is not
statistically significant in the first regression (Table 1), where it represents the per capita GDP
growth from 1960-1975 minus the sample average for that period. This fact is not surprising
given the relationship displayed in Figure 1. In the second regression (Table 2), the one most
similar to Rodrik’s (1999), the coefficient, which represents per capita growth 1960-1975, is
statistically significant (as it is for Rodrik’s). Again, this finding is not surprising since the
dependent variable is per capita growth over 1975-1992 minus per capita growth over 1960-
1975.
Tables 1 and 2
Comparing the results shown in Table 2, Column 1 with the results from the two most
similar of Rodrik’s regressions (reported in Table 4, columns 5 and 6 of Rodrik), the
magnitude, sign, and significance of most coefficients are quite similar to or the same as those
in Rodrik’s regressions. One difference is that my substituting the population dependency
variables for Rodrik’s measure of terms of trade shocks (a variable not significant in his
regressions) seems to improve the explanatory power—an adjusted R
2 of 0.70 versus 0.62 and11
0.54 in Rodrik’s study. It should be noted that Rodrik’s measure of government is somewhat
different; the other variables, however, are essentially the same. More interesting though is
the Asia dummy variable. This variable is positive and significant in Rodrik’s regressions, but
not in either of mine. Rodrik claimed to be disappointed that the Asia dummy variable
remained significant after the introduction of proxies for social conflict. It appears that youth
dependency is the variable that needs to be added to describe Asia’s experience in this
turbulent time of economic growth (a fact probably not surprising to Bloom and Williamson,
1998).
The main motivation for the first formulation of the dependent variable (i.e., the
difference between growth in the second period and the sample average growth rate for the
second period) was to address statistical problems that might have arisen from the second
formulation. In the second formulation of the dependent variable (i.e., the growth differential
between 1960 to 1975 and 1975 to 1992), the regression contains income growth from 1960
to 1975 on both sides of the equation. However, in all the regressions run, like those shown in
Table 1 and Table 2, Column 1, the results were essentially the same for both formulations
(except that the lagged growth term was insignificant for the first formulation). Thus, for
brevity and consistency with the Rodrik study, I report statistics only from the second
formulation of the dependent variable (the growth differential) in all of the following tables.
In Table 2, Column 2 I examine whether trade impacts GDP growth stability. I include
variables that measure openness to trade and the extent to which countries’ trade relies on
commodities. The variable, TRADEOPEN, is total trade—imports plus exports—in percent
of GDP averaged over 1975-1990 (data from Global Development Finance and World
Development Indicators). In order to determine whether a country’s openness to trade made it
susceptible to shocks over 1975-1990, it might seem reasonable to gather data over an earlier
period, like 1970-1974 (which is what Rodrik did in his analysis of trade).  I use the 1975-12
1990 data because using an earlier period would mean “loosing” countries from my data set (I
loose only Iraq with the longer, more recent period), and the TRADEOPEN variable when
calculated using the two different periods is highly correlated (0.94). In addition, this
regression contains two dummy variables, EXPORTOIL and EXPORTPRIM, that measure
the extent to which a country’s trade depends on fuel (mostly oil) or nonfuel primary products
(SITC 0, 1, 2, 4, and 68), respectively. These two variables have values of one if the export
category described above accounts for 50 percent or more of the country’s total exports in the
period 1988-1992 (data from World Development Report 1995).
It seems reasonable, a priori, that countries heavily reliant on commodities would be
susceptible to shocks (particularly of the energy induced variety). From Column 2, Table 2 it
is clear openness to trade had nothing to do with the growth collapse (Rodrik, 1999, similarly
finds three different trade variables statistically insignificant); however, the structure of
exports (a variable not used by Rodrik) does have an impact. Countries heavily reliant on
primary (nonfuel) exports will be more likely to experience a growth collapse. The coefficient
for oil exporters, although not statistically significant at a standard level (the probability
associated with its t-statistic is 0.77), is positive.  This surprising result (i.e., a positive
coefficient) may be explained by the fact many major oil producers, like Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait, were left out of the sample.
5. Further investigation
Initially, I believed the Sub-Saharan African or Asian countries would be the cause of
any instability in the regression results. However, a series of Chow tests confirmed that the
Latin American and Caribbean countries justified a structural change in the relationship.
Table 3 shows the previous regression (displayed in Table 2, Column 2) run with the sample
divided among Latin American and Caribbean countries (a total of 25) and all other countries
in the original sample (68). The first half of the table indicates the results are robust for13
African, Mediterranean, and Asian countries—all of the statistically significant dependent
variables are still significant (with the exception of level of youth dependency). In addition,
the adjusted R
2 increased from 0.70 to 0.78 with the exclusion of the Latin American and
Caribbean countries. On the other hand, for the regression run only with Latin American and
Caribbean countries, the only variable that is at all significant is GDP growth over 1960-1975.
Table 3
5.1 Latin American and Caribbean experience
To further explore the difference in the development experience in the Western
Hemisphere, I add a variable to measure terms of trade shock (Rodrik included a trade shock
variable that is significant in about half of his regressions). This variable, TRADESHOCK, is
the standard deviation over 1960-1995 of the growth in export deflator minus growth in
import deflator, weighted by current LCU shares of exports and imports in GDP (it comes
from Easterly and Kraay, 1999).  In addition, I examine whether high debt (a serious problem
in many Latin American countries), accumulated just prior to, or at the beginning of, the
shocks, contributed to the growth collapse (Rodrik rejected this hypothesis for his entire
sample). The variable, DEBTAV7277, is external debt as a percentage of GDP averaged over
1972-1977 (data from Global Development Finance and World Development Indicators).
Latitude and distance from the equator are often used in growth regressions to capture both
cultural (e.g., institutions) and/or environmental (e.g., the tropic’s specific challenges for
growth) impacts (see, for example, Bloom and Sachs, 1998 and Hall and Jones, 1999).  I
include both a measure of north-south distance, LATITUDE (degrees latitude converted to
decimals), and distance from the equator, DISTEQUAT (the absolute value of latitude).
Table 4, Column 1 displays the impact of including the TRADESHOCK variable.
Terms of trade shocks seem to have a great impact in explaining the growth collapse in Latin
America since the R
2 of the regression increased to 0.87 from 0.28 without this variable.14
(Adding TRADESHOCK meant Barbados and Suriname were dropped from the original
Latin America sample.) In addition, the inclusion of TRADESHOCK caused both openness to
trade (although implying greater trade led to lower growth) and initial (1975) youth
dependency (at the 90 percent level) to become significant.  Also, a dummy variable for the
dependence of oil exports (equal to one for Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela) was
significant. Table 4, Column 2 indicates that debt burden had nothing to do with the growth
collapse (again, confirming Rodrik’s result). Given the insignificance of DEBTAV7277 (t-
statistic of 0.02), the fact that initial GDP per capita and government institutions became
significant is probably the result of excluding Puerto Rico from the data set.
Table 4
North-south distance, or latitude, is significant (as shown in Table 4, Column 3).
Indeed, the inclusion of this variable caused government institutions and ethnic
fractionalization (at the 90 percent level) to become significant, and initial youth dependency
(significant in Column 1) and openness to trade (which previously had a counter-intuitive,
negative sign) to be insignificant. Moreover, the explanatory power of the regression was
increased (R
2 rose to 0.92). However, distance from the equator, interestingly, is not
significant (see Table 4, Column 4) at a standard level (t-statistic is 1.3). The fact that latitude,
but not distance from the equator, is significant and negative, implies that the specific
geography of the Western Hemisphere is important, but environment (e.g., proximity to the
tropics) is not. Since the continents in the Western Hemisphere have major axes that run
North-to-South, countries tend to be similar according to latitude (as opposed to Eurasia,
where countries of similar latitudes vary greatly).
Further evidence that latitude captures important similarities and differences among
these countries in ways more popular measures do not was that variables for the percent of
population speaking English, percent speaking any European language, percent Catholic, and15
dummy variables for islands and English legal origin were all insignificant (results not
shown). A dummy variable for the tropics (one for a country with a latitude between
plus/minus 23 degrees), was significant (not shown). However, this tropics variable only
distinguishes the southern cone countries (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay),
something latitude obviously does as well. Moreover, the sign for tropics and latitude
coefficient implied the same relationship with growth. Not only is the growth experience of
Latin American and Caribbean countries different from the rest of the world, their experience
can be further separated regionally. The importance of US, British, or Spanish influence, as
well as the strength of indigenous cultures, to some degree, vary latitudinally, and thus, this
influence may be more accurately captured by latitude than with dummy variables or shares
of a specific population.
5.2 Demographic influences revisited
The African, Mediterranean, and Asian countries are the ones for which demography
was significant in explaining growth instability. For these countries, unlike for Latin
American and Caribbean countries, TRADESHOCK (as well as TRADEOPEN) was not
important in explaining the economic growth instability—TRADESHOCK had a t-statistic of
0.27 (result not shown). In the next regressions, I decompose the dependency effect by the
growth of the individual populations. Particularly, I use POP014CHANGE7590, defined as
the growth rate of the 14-years and under population over the 1975 to 1990 period,
POP1564CHANGE7590, defined as the growth rate of the working-age population, and
POP65UPCHANGE7590, defined as the growth rate of the retired population. To specifically
capture the impact of changes in infant mortality on the growth of the young population, I
also add a term for the average percentage change in infant mortality over 1977-1982,
INFANTMORTCHANGE7782.16
Table 5, Column 1 shows that youth dependency’s impact on growth stability was
driven by the negative impact of an increase in the young population, rather than a positive
impact of an increase in working-age population, since the coefficient for this second factor is
not statistically significant. (Likewise, the change in retired population was not significantly
different from zero.) The explicit inclusion of the change in the young population meant that
the level of youth dependency is not at all statistically significant, that the dummy variable for
sub-Saharan Africa (usually negative and significant in growth regressions) is also not at all
statistically significant, and that the dummy variable for primary exports is now only
marginally significant (at or just below the 90 percent level).
Table 5, Column 2 indicates that a drop in infant mortality early in the period was
correlated with a subsequent increase in economic growth (although not all at a standard level
of statistical significance—t-statistic of 0.6). A non-significant (and certainly a non-positive)
coefficient for infant mortality change is contrary to the Bloom and Williamson (1998)
argument that population growth stemming from a fall in infant mortality should have an
immediate negative effect on economic growth. However, given the apparent endogeneaity
between economic growth and improvements in infant mortality, the relationship indicated in
Table 5, Column 2 is not surprising. Although international aid and other mechanisms of
technology transfer have led to a convergence among countries in many health related
measures, like, for example, life expectancy (see Wilson, 2001), improvements in infant
mortality show a pattern of divergence. For example, in the sample of developing countries I
use, the correlation between the level of infant mortality in 1977 and the improvement in
infant mortality over 1977-1990 is 0.47. In other words, a lower level of infant mortality in
1977 is associated with a greater improvement—or more negative change—in infant
mortality over the following period; thus, the positive correlation implies divergence. The17
correlation between the level of infant mortality in 1977 and GDP per capita in 1975 is –0.7,
i.e., higher GDP is associated with lower infant mortality, again suggesting divergence.
The most surprising result of the regressions shown in Table 5 is that the change in the
working-age population is insignificant. The recent population and economic growth
literature argues that working-age cohorts are the part of the population whose growth
contributes to economic growth.  One possible explanation for this insignificance is that the
growth of the working-aged population, although good for economic growth, has little impact
on the stability of economic growth. Another possibility is provided by Lindh and Malmberg
(1999), who break the working-age cohort down further, and find that for OECD countries
young adults (age 15-29) have a negative impact on economic growth, while the 50-64 age
group has the strongest positive influence. Thus, I break down the change in the working-age
population into the change in the 15-29 age group and the change in the 30-64 age group. The
coefficients for these two new variables (results not shown) were of opposite signs
(coefficient for the 15-29 age group was negative) and of similar absolute magnitudes, as the
new theory would predict; however, neither coefficient was statistically significant. Perhaps a
further break down of the working-age population would find a cohort with a statistically
significant positive impact on economic growth stability.
Table 5
Next, I explore how prior growth in the youth population might be good for economic
growth, in light of the surprising result that growth of the working-age population was
insignificant, by considering youth population’s interaction with human capital. It seems
reasonable that if countries with growing young populations invest in education, they would
reap benefits later on. To test this theory, I create and apply a number of interaction terms
consisting of combinations of 1975 primary and secondary enrollment ratios (data from Barro
and Lee) and earlier periods of young (ages 0-14) population change (1965-1975 and 1970-18
1980). None of these interaction terms entered the regressions as statistically significant—
indeed, they all had t-statistics of one or less (results not shown).  One explanation for this
disappointing result is none of my interaction terms fully represents the benefit of a growing,
more educated population (perhaps, because the dates I use to calculate the terms are not
accurately capturing the timing of these effects). Another explanation is data quality—eight
countries (from the initial 69) were dropped from the regressions because of lack of
enrollment data.
Lastly, I look at how geographic variables (latitude and distance from the equator)
may influence the growth collapse for this second group of countries. Not surprisingly,
latitude (given the East-West orientation of Eurasia and, to a lesser degree, Africa) was not
significant (results not shown). In addition, neither distance from the equator nor a dummy
variable for the tropics was significant (results also not shown).
6. Conclusions
The paper makes a contribution by combining findings in two related, but until now,
rather unconnected literatures. Specifically, I use demographic variables to help explain the
instability of economic growth in developing countries, and in doing so, put forth a new
hypothesis on how population may impact economic growth. In addition, the paper shows
further evidence in defining the growth experience regionally.
Pritchett (2000) demonstrates the necessity of considering economic growth
instability—particularly for developing countries. Rodrik (1999) shows that growth instability
(or lack of it in the Asian case) is the defining characteristic of the Asian “miracle.” Bloom
and Williamson (1998) illustrate that the demographic transition (from high to low rates of
mortality/fertility) was an important part of the performance of the high-growth Asian
countries. This paper pulls these findings together by demonstrating that the demographic
transition (or lack of it) is valuable in explaining the stability of economic growth (or lack of19
it) for developing countries, even after accounting for institutional factors and other measures
of social division proved relevant by Rodrik (1999). Furthermore, this relationship between
growth stability and demographic change holds true for countries other than the high-growth
Asian ones. Indeed, adding the change in young population to the instability of growth
regressions of Rodrik, led the sub-Saharan Africa and the Asian dummy variables to be
statistically insignificant, when in typical growth regressions they are usually negative and
significant and positive and significant, respectively.
The importance in these regressions of both government quality and youth
dependency for African, Mediterranean, and Asian countries supports Bloom et al.’s (2001)
contention that; “The demographic dividend is not, however, automatic. Given the right kind
of policy environment, this demographic dividend can help to produce a sustained period of
economic growth. . . .” Also, combining the finding (discussed earlier in the paper) that
economic growth (for whatever reasons) became considerably more difficult beginning in the
latter half of the 1970s with this paper’s theory of population’s impact on weathering
economic shocks can help explain what Kelly and Schmidt (1995) call “the new negative
correlations.”  In other words, because the 1960s were a relatively trouble-free time for
economic growth, population dependency’s importance was not made clear; however, during
the more turbulent 1970s and 1980s countries with lower (and falling) dependency burdens
weathered the economic shocks better.  It appears rates of change, rather than levels, of youth
dependency is most important. Furthermore, when youth dependency was separated into its
component parts, growth of the young (0-14) population was highly significant (and had the
same sign as change in youth dependency), whereas growth of the working-age population
was insignificant.  However, disappointingly, interaction terms attempting to capture the
relationship among human capital (or school enrollment rates), growth in the youth20
population, and economic growth, were all statistically insignificant. Perhaps, more work on
the human capital aspect of population change’s influence would be rewarding.
It was surprising and a little frustrating that demographic change appeared to have no
impact on economic growth stability in Latin American and Caribbean countries (indeed, only
the trade shock variable matters much for this group). Neither levels of nor change in youth
dependency was significant for Latin American and Caribbean countries, a result that was
robust regardless whether the regressions used changes in aggregate youth dependency or the
individual population (i.e., aged 0-14 or 15-65, or even 15-29 or 30-65) growth rates. It was
hoped that the greater break down of working-age cohorts might capture the fact that the
demographic transition typically occurred at a slower rate in Latin America than in Asia. It is
not very satisfying to say a group of countries as large as Latin America and the Caribbean
are just different. However, Brock and Durlauf (2001) argue that growth correlates should not
be expected to have the same effect on such complex heterogeneous objects as countries, and
Block (2001) finds that Africa grows differently. Yet, interesting was the paper’s finding that
the experience of Western Hemisphere countries can be separated further according to
latitude—an important proxy, it was argued, for cultural, historical, and institutional
similarities in this part of the world.21
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Table 1. Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP Growth 1975-1992 Minus Developing Country Sample Average
Per-Capita GDP Growth 1975-1992














Notes: Standard Errors are White consistent. Levels of statistical significance indicated by asterisks: * 99
percent, ** 95 percent, *** 90 percent.
Table 2. Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP Growth 1975-1992 Minus Per-Capita GDP Growth 1960-1975
12
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 15.58* 2.97 16.76* 2.98
SSA -1.20** 0.61 -1.00 0.74
LAC -1.83* 0.59 -1.53* 0.61
ASIA 0.79 0.72 0.85 0.75
LNGDP75 -1.42* 0.31 -1.61* 0.33
GDPGROWTH6075 -0.90* 0.096 -0.89* 0.11
ETHINCFRAC -2.35* 0.80 -2.48* 0.89
QUALTGOV9801 1.38* 0.34 1.37* 0.40
YDEP75 -3.49** 1.49 -3.09** 1.49




N9 4 9 3
Adj. R
2 0.70 0.71
Notes: Standard Errors are White consistent. Levels of statistical significance indicated by asterisks: * 99
percent, ** 95 percent, *** 90 percent.24
Table 3. Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP Growth 1975-1992 Minus Per-Capita GDP Growth 1960-1975.
Sample split between Latin American and Caribbean countries and all other countries.
All other countries Latin Amer. & Carib.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 17.42* 3.26 14.89 13.68
SSA -0.96 0.73
ASIA 0.69 0.67
LNGDP75 -1.82* 0.36 -1.32 1.45
GDPGROWTH6075 -0.89* 0.12 -1.07* 0.33
ETHINCFRAC -2.61* 0.82 -0.24 2.45
QUALTGOV9801 1.40* 0.45 1.11 1.28
YDEP75 -2.28 1.82 -3.92 5.91
YOUTHDEPCHANGE -0.64* 0.20 -0.50 0.75
TRADEOPEN 0.004 0.006 -0.02 0.02
EXPORTOIL 0.87 0.76 0.23 1.82
EXPORTPRIM -0.97** 0.49 -1.37 1.32
N6 8 2 5
Adj. R
2 0.78 0.28
Notes: Standard Errors are White consistent. Levels of statistical significance indicated by asterisks: * 99
percent, ** 95 percent, *** 90 percent.
Table 4. Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP Growth 1975-1992 Minus Per-Capita GDP Growth 1960-1975.










C 17.74** 6.86 20.56* 6.38 7.29 5.13 16.54** 6.26
GDPGROWTH6075 -0.87* 0.22 -1.03* 0.23 -0.98* 0.19 -0.78* 0.23
LNGDP75 -1.20 0.79 -1.70** 0.74 -0.51 0.62 -1.33 0.82
EXPORTPRIM 0.33 0.61 0.085 0.80 -0.78 0.44 0.024 0.46
EXPORTOIL 3.62* 1.12 3.78* 0.95 3.43* 0.86 4.05* 1.22
YDEP75 -4.47*** 2.38 -2.87 2.41 2.65 2.53 -3.30 2.01
YOUTHDEPCHANGE -0.30 0.24 -0.53 0.32 0.19 0.15 -0.32 0.23
ETHINCFRAC -1.64 1.14 -0.72 1.22 -1.52*** 0.84 -0.95 1.02
TRADEOPEN -0.016** 0.0071 -0.032** 0.012 0.0058 0.0084 -0.013 0.0073
QUALTGOV9801 0.92 0.60 1.26*** 0.58 0.93** 0.39 0.79 0.54




N 2 32 22 32 3
Adj. R
2 0.87 0.89 0.92 0.87
Notes: Standard Errors are White consistent. Levels of statistical significance indicated by asterisks: * 99
percent, ** 95 percent, *** 90 percent.25
Table 5. Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP Growth 1975-1992 Minus Per-Capita GDP Growth 1960-1975.
Sample does not include Latin American and Caribbean countries.
12
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 17.54* 3.07 18.05* 3.15
SSA -0.55 0.68 -0.50 0.69
ASIA 1.00 0.67 1.03 0.67
LNGDP75 -1.80* 0.34 -1.89* 0.37
GDPGROWTH6075 -0.81* 0.13 -0.80* 0.14
ETHINCFRAC -2.79* 0.79 -2.82* 0.79
QUALTGOV9801 1.59* 0.45 1.60* 0.44
YDEP75 -0.88 1.83 -0.97 1.83
POP014CHANGE7590 -0.68* 0.19 -0.65* 0.20
POP1564CHANGE7590 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.42
POP65UPCHANGE7590 -0.12 0.18 -0.12 0.18
EXPORTOIL 0.92 0.84 0.99 0.85
EXPORTPRIM -0.84*** 0.51 -0.83 0.51
INFANTMORTCHANGE7782 -0.064 0.11
N6 9 6 9
Adj. R
2 0.79 0.78
Notes: Standard Errors are White consistent. Levels of statistical significance indicated by asterisks: * 99
percent, ** 95 percent, *** 90 percent.
Figure 1: The relationship between average, yearly per-capita GDP growth over the periods 1960-1975 and





















Figure 2: The relationship between average, yearly per-capita GDP growth over 1960-1975 and average, yearly
change in the youth dependency ratio (the population ages 0-14 over population 15-64) over the same period for
the same 94 developing countries shown in Figure 1.
Figure 3: The relationship between average, yearly per-capita GDP growth over 1975-1992 and average, yearly





























































Countries used in study with most recent year of GDP per capita data (if not 1992)
ALGERIA GUINEA NIGERIA
ANGOLA 1989 GUINEA-BISSAU 1990 PAKISTAN
ARGENTINA 1990 GUYANA 1989 PANAMA
BANGLADESH HAITI PAPUA NEW
GUINEA
BARBADOS 1989 HONDURAS PARAGUAY
BENIN 1990 HONG KONG PERU
BOLIVIA INDIA PHILIPPINES
BOTSWANA 1989 INDONESIA PUERTO RICO 1989
BRAZIL IRAN 1987 RWANDA
BURKINA FASO IRAQ SENEGAL 1990
BURUNDI JAMAICA 1990 SIERRA LEONE
CAMEROON JORDAN 1990 SINGAPORE






CHAD LESOTHO SRI LANKA
CHILE LIBERIA 1986 SURINAME 1990
CHINA MADAGASCAR SWAZILAND 1989
COLOMBIA MALAWI SYRIAN ARAB
REPUBLIC
1989
CONGO MALAYSIA TAIWAN, CHINA 1990
COSTA RICA MALI TANZANIA 1990






ECUADOR MEXICO TUNISIA 1990
EGYPT MOROCCO TURKEY
EL SALVADOR 1986 MOZAMBIQUE UGANDA
ETHIOPIA 1990 MYANMAR 1989 URUGUAY
FIJI NAMIBIA VENEZUELA
GABON 1990 NEPAL 1986 ZAIRE (Congo,
Dem. Rep.)
1989
GAMBIA, THE NICARAGUA 1990 ZAMBIA 1989
GHANA NIGER 1989 ZIMBABWE 1990
GUATEMALA